Abstract: Building on Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)'s framework of dynamic psychological games and the progress in the modeling of dynamic unawareness by Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a) we model and analyze the impact of asymmetric awareness in the strategic interaction of players motivated by reciprocity and guilt. Specifically we characterize extensive-form games with psychological payoffs and simple unawareness, define extensive-form rationalizability and, using this, show that unawareness has a pervasive impact on the strategic interaction of psychologically motivated players. Intuitively, unawareness influences players' beliefs concerning, for example, the intentions and expectations of others which in turn impacts their behavior.
Introduction
(2009) present general frameworks for analyzing the strategic interaction of players with psychological payoffs: "psychological games". Roughly speaking, psychological games are games in which players' preferences depend upon players' beliefs about the strategies that are being played, players' beliefs about the beliefs of others about the strategies that are being played, and so on.
A widely unspoken assumption that is underlying game-theoretic analyses, and therefore also the analyses of psychological games, is that players are aware of all facts characterizing the strategic environment they are in. However, in many real life situations this is not the case. People often have asymmetric awareness levels concerning their own as well as the feasible choices of others although they are part of the same strategic environment. People are frequently surprised in the sense that they become aware of new strategic alternatives by observing actions they had previously been unaware of. In recent years different models of unawareness have been proposed showing the importance of unawareness for individual decision making problems as well as the strategic interaction of players in standard (non-psychological) games (for example, Fagin and Halpern 1988; Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini 1998; Modica and Rustichini 1999; Halpern 2001; Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper 2006 , 2013a , 2013b Halpern and Rêgo 2006 , 2009 Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper 2008; Li 2009; Grant and Quiggin 2013) .
However, it is not only in standard games that unawareness is important. We show in our analysis that unawareness has a profound and distinct impact on the strategic interaction of players in psychological games. To see this consider the following intuitive example: Imagine two friends, Ann and Bob. Assume it is Bob's birthday, he is planning a party and would be very happy, if Ann could come. Unfortunately Bob's birthday coincides with the date of Ann's final exam at university. She can either decide to take the exam the morning after Bob's party or two weeks later at a second date. Ann is certain that Bob would feel let down, if she were to cancel his party without having a very good excuse. Quite intuitively, although Ann would really like to get over her exam as soon as possible, she might anticipate feeling guilty from letting down Bob if she canceled his party to take the exam the following morning. As a consequence, Ann might choose the second date to avoid letting Bob down. In contrast, consider now the following variant of the same example: Ann knows that Bob is unaware of the second date. In this situation Ann might choose to take the exam on the first date and not feel guilty. Since Bob is unaware of the second date and the final exam is a good excuse, he does not expect Ann to come. Ann knows this and, hence, does not feel guilty as Bob is not let down. In fact, if she were certain that Bob would never become aware of the second date, she probably had an emotional incentive to leave him unaware in order not to raise his expectations. That is, she had an incentive not to make him aware of the fact that she actually has the time to come to his party, but just wants to get over her exam. Interestingly, if Ann were only interested in her own payoff in this strategic situation with unawareness, she would not care whether Bob is or will become aware of the second date. She would simply not attend his party irrespective of Bob's awareness. Only her belief-dependent feeling of guilt towards Bob creates the strong emotional incentive to leave him unaware.
Bob's unawareness concerning Ann's ability to come to his party and, connectedly, Ann's incentive not to tell him about the second date intuitively highlight the focus of our analysis. We analyze the influence and importance of unawareness concerning feasible paths of play for the strategic interaction of players in psychological games. To simplify the analysis we concentrate on twoplayer strategic environments with simple unawareness. More specifically, building on Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) 's framework of dynamic psychological games and the recent progress in the modeling of (Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper 2006 , 2013a , 2013b , we define a two-player model in which players are motivated by psychological payoffs and one player is potentially unaware of certain feasible paths of play. More specifically, in our two-player setting with simple unawareness, one player is initially aware of all paths of play, whereas the other player is initially unaware of some paths of play. We assume that the aware player is aware of the unaware player's unawareness, but the unaware player is not. We refrain from moves of chance implying that players' information sets are singletons. We restrict ourselves in this way to clearly investigate and highlight the pervasive role of asymmetric awareness on the strategic interaction of players motivated by belief-dependent preferences. Extensions to broader settings are of course feasible, and will definitely allow for the analysis of a lot of interesting applications, but we leave it for future research to explore these directions. Using our framework we provide different examples highlighting the role of unawareness in the strategic interaction of players motivated by reciprocity à la Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and guilt aversion à Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) .We limit ourselves to twoplayer environments and simple asymmetric awareness scenarios in order to intuitively introduce our model and clearly uncover the role of unawareness without burdening the analysis with technical issues arising in strategic environments allowing for more players and more complex unawareness.
Our examples demonstrate that the strategic behavior of players motivated by psychological payoffs crucially depends on their awareness concerning the strategic environment they are in, their perception concerning the awareness of others, their perception concerning the perception of others, and so on -a fact that implies both an opportunity as well as a challenge to analyses empirically investigating the strength and nature of psychological payoffs. On the one hand, in line with experimental evidence suggesting that people are more prone to selfish choices if they believe that others will remain unaware of them (for example, Dana, Cain, and Dawes 2006, Dana, Weber, and Kuang 2007; Broberg, Ellingsen, and Johannesson 2007; Andreoni and Bernheim 2009; Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber 2012) ,our examples show that redchanging the awareness of players that are motivated by psychological payoffs leads to intuitive and testable predictions distinct from predictions based on consequentialist preferences like selfishness and inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) . On the other hand, it poses a challenge for experimental investigations in relatively uncontrolled environments like the field or the Internet. As also seen in our introductory example, not controlling for Ann's perception concerning Bob's awareness might lead to wrong inferences concerning Ann's inclination to feel guilty towards Bob. Furthermore, our examples reveal that over and above the actual choices that are made, managing other people's awareness levels has to be understood as an integral and important part of any strategic interaction. By managing other's awareness, we influence the others' expectations and perceptions concerning our intentions, which in turn influences their behavior.
We start out by formulating a model concentrating on two-player extensiveforms with complete information, observable actions and no chance moves. To allow for unawareness we use a standard extensive-form representing the game tree and a subtree thereof, and define extensive-forms with simple unawareness with the help of singleton information sets. These singleton information sets describes at each decision node in the game tree, and copy thereof in the subtree, the frame of mind of a player. Our two-player extensive-forms are in essence a special case of Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a) 's generalized extensive-forms, and therefore embeddable in their setting.Of course, our extensive-form with unawareness is not typically common knowledge among players, and therefore should be interpreted from the modeler's point of view. In fact, any game that does not explicitly distinguish between the players' description of the strategic environment and the modeler's will fail to capture (see Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini 1998) .
Having defined our class of two-player extensive-forms with unawareness, we formally characterize psychological payoffs in our setting. In synthesis, we define a player's strategies and conditional beliefs about the other player's pure strategies (first-order beliefs), beliefs about the other player's beliefs (secondorder beliefs), and so on. The infinite hierarchy of conditional beliefs that we define takes player's awareness, players's perception regarding the other's awareness, and so forth, into account and is used for the general specification of our psychological payoffs and, hence, the characterization of our class of dynamic psychological games with simple unawareness. As mentioned above, specific types of psychological payoffs that can be embedded in our model are among others reciprocity and guilt aversion. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) , Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) and Sebald (2010) propose sequential equilibrium as a solution concept for their psychological games. However, assuming equilibrium play is very demanding in strategic environments involving unawareness. The implicit assumption made when imposing sequential equilibrium on strategic settings with unawareness is that if a player becomes aware of more during the game, he will compute new equilibrium beliefs not rationalizing, for example, why the other player made him aware. Sequential equilibrium only requires a player to reason about the other player's future behavior. For this reason, we impose extensive-form rationalizability (Pearce 1984) , which embodies forward induction, as a solution concept for our psychological games with simple unawareness. Extensive-form rationalizability implies, that along each feasible path of play, every active player is always certain that the other player sequential best responds, certain that the other player is certain that he sequential best responds, and so on. If a player finds himself at some information set, where the other player's strategies that could lead to that information set are inconsistent with the players previous certainty in the other player's best response, then the player seeks a best rationalization which could have led to that information set (Battigalli 1997; Battigalli and Siniscalchi 2002) . That is, if the player is "surprised" by the other player's unexpected action, and cannot use Bayesian updating, then he forms new beliefs that justify this observed inconsistency. In its simplest form, forward-induction reasoning involves the assumption that, upon observing an unexpected (but undominated) action of the other player, a player maintains the working hypothesis that the latter is a sequential best response. The best rationalization principle captures precisely this type of argument.
After having defined our model, the solution concept and two prominent notions of psychological payoffs, reciprocity and guilt aversion, we describe two examples to highlight the role of unawareness in the interaction of players motivated by reciprocity and guilt aversion. First, we consider a version of the sequential prisoners dilemma also analyzed by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) featuring a reciprocal second mover, Bob, who is unaware that the first mover, Ann, can defect.
1 Different to Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) 's 1 Note that this awareness scenario is similar to the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with unawareness analyzed in Feinberg (2004) . The organization of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we introduce dynamic games with simple unawareness. Following this, in Section 3, we define the hierarchies of beliefs and psychological payoffs. Section 4 contains the definition of our solution concept: extensive-form rationalizability. In Section 5 we give two examples of how our model can be applied. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Dynamic Games with Simple Unawareness
A finite extensive-form game with singleton information sets and no chance moves, called the simple unawareness game, is played by two players, player i and some other player j, who move one at a time and have possibly different views on the feasible paths of play. One player is initially aware of all paths of play, whereas the other player is initially unaware of some paths of play. The aware player knows that the other player is unaware, while the unaware player is unaware of his own unawareness and thinks that the other player is aware of the same as he. The game specifies material payoffs for each player at each terminal node. These payoffs describe the material consequences of the players' actions, not their preferences. The players' psychological payoffs will be introduced in Section 3.
The simple unawareness game we consider adapts Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a) 's generalization of the standard extensive-form game (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, chapter 3.3) . By simple unawareness we mean that our game is restricted to unawareness with just two trees -a game tree specifying all physical paths of play and a subtree thereof. Both will be described in detail below. Our game allows for a parsimonious analysis of the applications we consider. More general applications and extensions are certainly very interesting (for example, delusion or awareness of unawareness) but are left for future research in order to not burden our analysis with additional notational complexity.
Game tree. The physical paths of play are given by a finite set T * of nodes together with a binary relation 0 on T * that represents precedence. The binary relation 0 must be a partial order, and ðT * , 0Þ must form an arborescence: the relation 0 totally orders the predecessors of each member of T * . The order of play thus constitute a game tree that begins at an initial node with no predecessor and then proceeds along some path from node to an immediate successor, terminating when a node with no successor is reached. The various paths give the various possible orders of play. Let Z denote the set of terminal nodes, and let X = T * nZ be the set of decision nodes.
Moves in the game tree. To represent the choices available to players at decision nodes, we have a finite set A of actions and a function ψ that labels each non-initial decision node x with the last action taken to reach it. We require that ψ be one-toone on the set of immediate successors of each decision node x, so that different successors correspond to different actions. Let AðxÞ denote the set of feasible actions at x. Actions are labeled so that AðxÞ ∩ Aðx′Þ = 1 for x ≠ x′. To represent the rules for determining who moves at a decision node, we have a function ι : X ! fi, jg that assigns to each decision node the player whose turn it is.
Subtree. A subtree is defined by a subset of nodes T & T * for which ðT, 0Þ is also an arborescence -perhaps starting at a different initial node. To ensure that the subtree is associated with well-defined payoffs to the players, we impose that all terminal nodes in the subtree are also in Z. Decision nodes that appear in the subtree, also appear in the game tree. We will need to explicitly differentiate these decision nodes and define them as distinct elements. To this effect, we label by y the copy of the decision node x, whenever the copy of x is part of the subtree T. Let Y be the set of copies of decision nodes in the subtree. The subtree together with the structure introduced below is intended to model the subjective partial view of the player.
Moves in the subtree. To ensure consistency between moves in the game tree and subtree, we impose that feasible actions at the copy y of decision node x are given by a non-empty subset AðyÞ AðxÞ for which the properties of the Simple Unawareness in Dynamic Psychological Games function ψ are not violated. This implies that if the action a 2 AðxÞ leads from x to successor x′ in the game tree T * , then a also leads from the copy y to y′ (the copy of x′ in the subtree T) whenever both copies appear in the subtree. We also require that the same player moves at decision node x and copy y, so that there is no disagreement about which player that has to move.
To exemplify the implications of the above definitions, consider the the extensive-form underlying the sequential prisoners dilemma also analyzed by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) :
Consider first the game tree T * in Figure 1 . At the initial node x 0 , Ann is active and can corporate (the action C) or defect (the action D). At nodes x 1 and x 2 , Bob is active and can corporate (the action c) or defect (the action d). Now consider the subtree T. The copy of decision node x 2 is not a part of the subtree, which implies that at the copy y 0 of the initial node x 0 , Ann only has one feasible action C. Bob, on the other hand, can still choose c or d when he is active at copy y 1 of decision node x 1 .
Generic decision nodes. A generic decision node n is an element of the disjoint union N = X ∪ Y. By generic we mean that n can describe both decision nodes x 2 X as well as the copies y 2 Y. Singleton information sets. The information players have when choosing their actions is the most subtle part of our simple unawareness games. In the simple unawareness game players know all previous moves, but a player's frame of mind may not allow him to be aware of all paths of play. The information possessed by player i is represented by singleton information sets h i ðnÞ 2 H i for all n 2 N. The singleton information set h i ðnÞ defines the frame of mind of player i by identifying the paths of play the player conceives possible at n. Unlike a standard information set, the generic decision node n does not need to be contained in h i ðnÞ. at decision node x in the game tree T * it might be that h i ðxÞ is in the subtree T. When the singleton information set h i ðnÞ is in the subtree T, player i is unaware of all paths of play not described by the subtree. In games with psychological payoffs, it is important to represent players' information also at nodes where they are not active. The information structure H i of player i thus contains, as a subset I i & H i , the information structure of active player i. That is, the subset I i contains as elements singleton information sets h i ðnÞ of player ιðnÞ = i.
Let T′ and T′′ be two generic trees that each can be either the subtree T or the game tree T * . Each singleton information set h i ðnÞ 2 H i has the following static properties that parallel those in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a, 59-60 ) (see also Properties U0-U3 are all static properties, as a dynamic property we impose perfect recall. We require that if generic decision node n′′ 2 h i ðn′Þ and if n is a predecessor of n′, then there is a predecessorn of n′′ in the same tree as n′′ for which h i ðnÞ = h i ðnÞ, and that the action taken at n along the path to n′ is the same as the action taken atn along the path to n′′. Intuitively, the generic decision nodes n′ and n′′ are distinguished by information player i does not have, so he cannot have had it when he was at information set h i ðnÞ; n′ and n′′ must be consistent with the same action at h i ðnÞ, since the player remembers his action there. Perfect recall together with confined awareness implies that the player cannot become unaware along a path of play. Suppose that y′ 2 h i ðn′Þ, h i ðn′Þ 2 T and generic decision node n is a predecessor of n′. For y′ there is -by perfect recall -a copy y 2 T that is a predecessor of y′, such that h i ðyÞ = h i ðnÞ. By confined awareness it must be that h i ðnÞ 2 T. Thus, player i could not have been aware of more at n.
In games with psychological payoffs, where players somehow care about the beliefs or intentions of others, it is also important to be explicit about what a player is aware of and what he -given this awareness -thinks the other player is aware of. To be explicit about this, we use composite singleton information sets h ji ðnÞ = h j h i ðnÞ.
3 Finally, each player's singleton information set is assumed a primitive of the game. When there is no need to be explicit it thus
Figure 2: Examples that agree and disagree with properties U0-U3.
3 Composite information sets can be more involved, for example, h i h j h i ðnÞ which is player i's perception at node n of player j's perception of his frame of mind. However, in our setting with simple unawareness such involved iterative frames of mind will be redundant (due to property "U2 Introspection"). makes sense to write h i instead of h i ðnÞ, use the notation ιðh i Þ and Aðh i Þ instead of ιðnÞ and AðnÞ, and write h ji instead of h ji ðnÞ. Figure 3 displays the extensive-form underlying the sequential prisoners dilemma considered in Figure 1 now with singleton information sets that are consistent with properties U0-U3 and perfect recall added. In the figure, singleton information sets are shown as arrows. The "solid arrows" indicate Ann's singleton information sets, while the "broken arrows" indicate Bob's singleton information sets. For the sake of simplicity, we omit Bob's redundant singleton information sets at y 0 and y 1 . Ann is aware when active. When choosing an action at singleton information set h A ðx 0 Þ, she considers the physical paths of play. At h A ðy 0 Þ the action C should be interpreted as the action she would have taken had she only been aware of feasible path of play in the subtree. Moreover, she thinks that Bob is unaware since h BA ðx 0 Þ 2 T. A i ðh i Þ be the set of all actions for player i. A pure strategy for aware player i is a map s i : I i ! A i , with s i ðh i Þ 2 Aðh i Þ for h i 2 I i . A pure strategy for player i thus specifies an action at each of the singleton information sets at which the player is active. Player i's set of pure strategies, S i , is simply the space of all such s i . Since each of these pure strategies is a map Simple Unawareness in Dynamic Psychological Games from singleton information sets to some action, we can write S i as the Cartesian product of the action sets at each h i :
Because the aware player i is aware of all of his singleton information sets, his set of pure strategies is equal to S i . Remember, in our simple unawareness game only the game tree T * represents the physical paths of play. The subtree T represents the restricted subjective view of the feasible paths in the mind of an unaware player, or the view of the feasible paths that an aware player assign to the unaware player, and so on. Moreover, as the game evolves a player may become aware of paths of which he was unaware earlier.
A strategy can thus not in the simple unawareness game be conceived as an ex ante plan of actions. Instead, it should be interpret as a list of answers to the question "what would player i do if h i were the singleton information set he considers as possible?" For example, in Figure 3 we can identify aware Ann's strategies at the singleton information set h A ðx 0 Þ with the actions C and D -the actions she actually takes. Aware Ann's set of strategies is thus S A = fCC, DCg, where the first index refers to the action taken at h A ðx 0 Þ and the second index to the action
Bob is aware, not only of the fact that he can take actions c and d, but also that he could have taken the actions c and d at h B ðx 1 Þ following Ann's action C. We can thus identify Bob's strategies by S B = fcc, cd, dc, ddg. Denote by S = S i × S j the set of strategy pairs. The path caused by a strategy pair s 2 S yields a terminal node denoted zðsÞ 2 Z. Strategy s i reaches singleton information set h i if the path induced by s 2 S reaches h i . Otherwise, we say that h i is excluded by the strategy s i . The set of player i's strategies that reaches h i is denoted S i ðh i Þ. We will sometimes also write S j ðh i Þ, meaning player j's strategies that reach h i .
Unaware player i is unaware of singleton information sets in the game tree. For strategy s i 2 S i , we denote by s If R i S i is some set of strategies of player i, denote by R T i the set of strategies induced by R i in the subtree T. In the rest of the paper we will use the notation to define player i's strategies at a singleton information set h i .
It is important to understand that Bob at h B ðx 2 Þ (after he has become aware)
is not deluded to think that the strategic interaction at h B ðx 1 Þ is described by paths of play in the subtree, nor does he think that Ann was ever unaware. Rather, Bob interprets Ann's induced strategy s T A = fCg as describing the action Ann would have taken, had she decide to keep him unaware. For any solution concept we need to analyse what, for example, Ann thinks of Bob's actions in the subtree, such actions are determined by Bob's induced strategy. This is why Ann's strategy also determines her action at h A ðy 0 Þ in the subtree, even though she will never actually only consider this action as possible given that she is aware of all feasible paths of play.
Material payoffs. Above we defined the strategic interaction in an extensive form with simple unawareness. To obtain a dynamic game with simple unawareness we add a specification of the players' material payoffs assigned to the terminal nodes. Because each terminal node z 2 Z completely determines a path through the game tree, we can assign to player i material payoffs using functions π i : Z ! R.
Beliefs and Psychological Payoffs
Extensive games with simple unawareness, as described above, assumed that payoffs depend only on induced paths of play. This in not sufficient for describing the motivations and choices of players who care about, for example, guilt aversion and reciprocity. Psychological games, on the other hand, allow payoffs to depend directly on beliefs (about beliefs), and via such beliefs capture, for example, emotions like reciprocity and guilt.
Beliefs. Conditional on each singleton information set h i 2 H i , player i holds an updated, or revised, belief α i ðÁjh i Þ 2 ΔðS λðh i Þ j ðh i ÞÞ;
is the system of first-order beliefs of player i.
For example, at h B ðx 0 Þ in Figure 3 , Bob is certain that Ann's strategy is s T A = fCg. If Bob subsequently finds himself at h B ðx 2 Þ, then his belief will change, so that he now is certain that Ann's strategy is s A = fCDg. Bob thus becomes aware that Ann could have kept him unaware by choosing strategy s A = fCCg, but instead chose to make him aware by choosing action D.
At h i player i also holds a second-order belief β i ðh ji Þ about the first-order belief system α j of player j, a third-order belief about the second-order beliefs, and so on. For the purpose of this paper, we may assume that higher-order beliefs are degenerate point beliefs. Thus, with a slight abuse of notation we identify β i ðh ji Þ with a particular first-order belief system α j . A similar notational convention applies to other higher-order beliefs. Let the sequence μ i = ðα i , β i , . . .Þ denote player i's hierarchy of beliefs, and M i the (compact) set of such hierarchies. In our applications we consider beliefs at most of the second order.
At h A ðx 0 Þ in Figure 3 , Ann holds a first-order belief α A ðÁjh A ðx 0 ÞÞ 2 Δðfcc, cd, dc, ddgÞ. She thinks that Bob is unaware, and her belief about Bob's first-order belief about her strategy must reflect this. Ann thus needs to consider Bob's frame of mind. That is why her second-order belief β A ðh BA ðx 0 ÞÞ is conditioned on the composite singleton information set, implying that she is certain that Bob is certain that her strategy is s T A = fCg. Players should not change their beliefs unless the play reaches a singleton information set which falsifies it. We therefore assume that player i's hierarchy of beliefs M i are consistent such that: there is at least one strategy of player j in the support of α i ðÁjh i Þ at some h i , and that beliefs must satisfy Bayes' rule and common knowledge of Bayes' rule whenever possible. Consistency of the updating system requires that α i ðÁjh i Þ, β i ðh ji Þ, and so on, at h i are consistent with h i being reached and that no beliefs are abandoned unless falsified. Thus, when Bob in Figure 3 finds himself at h B ðx 2 Þ, he must change his beliefs such that they are consistent with being aware. Psychological payoffs. Section 2 defines dynamic games with simple unawareness. To obtain a dynamic psychological game with simple unawareness we extent payoffs to include beliefs. Specifically, we assign to player i psychological payoffs using functions u i : Z × M i ! R. The psychological payoffs will be obtained from the material payoff functions π i : Z ! R. We exemplify this definition by considering two prominent functional forms capturing simple guilt aversion and reciprocity, respectively.
Simple guilt aversion. Simple guilt aversion as in Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) implies that player i judges the initial expectations of player j concerning his material payoff and feels guilty whenever he does not live up to these expectations. Given his strategy s λðh j ðx 0 ÞÞ j and the first-order belief system α j , player j forms an initial expectation about his material payoffs π j :
For a given terminal node z the function
measures how much player j is "let down". Player i does not know player j's strategy and first-order beliefs, but holds a belief about these. Denote player i's belief about player j's "let down" by D ij ðz, s λðh ji ðx 0 ÞÞ j , β i Þ, where β i is player i's second-order belief system. Given this, player i is motivated by simply guilt aversion if his psychological payoffs are represented by:
where θ ij reflect player i's sensitivity to guilt. Guilt averse player i senses a psychological cost connected to his feeling of guilt in case he does not live up to his belief about player j's initial expectation and takes this into account when deciding on his optimal behavior. Players' feelings of guilt thus depend on their awareness, and their beliefs about the awareness of the other player. Reciprocity. Different from guilt aversion, reciprocity as in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) assumes that players judge the kindness of others. Whenever player i judges player j to be kind, he reciprocates by being kind himself. Whenever player i judges player j to be unkind, he acts unkindly in return. More formally, given a singleton information set h j , a strategy s λðh j Þ j that reaches h j and the first-order belief system α j , player j forms an expectation about player i's material payoff π i :
Player j's kindness towards player i is described by how much player j expects to give player i relative to some equitable payoff π e i ðh j Þ at singleton information set h j :
The equitable payoff is the threshold or neutral payoff above (below) which player j treats player i kindly (unkindly). In other words, if K j ðÁÞ > 0, then player j treats player i kindly. Conversely, if K j ðÁÞ < 0, then player j treats player i unkindly. Let the equitable payoff be
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The equitable payoff is the average player j is able to give to player i in material terms based on his awareness and first-order belief. As in the case of guilt aversion, player i does not know strategy s j and first-order beliefs α j , but holds a first-and second-order belief about them. Denote player i's judgement of player j's kindness at information set h i by
where β i is player i's second-order belief system. We say player i is motivated by reciprocity if he has belief-dependent preferences represented by a psychological payoff function of the form:
where Y i > 0 is player i's sensitivity to reciprocity. Whenever player i perceives player j to be kind, player i is motivated to also maximize player j's material payoff. In case player i judges player j to be unkind, player i is motivated to reduce player j's material payoff. This definition of reciprocity implies that if player i is unaware of paths of play, he judges the kindness of player j based on the paths that he is aware of.
Extensive-Form Rationalizability
We adapt to the present framework the extensive-form rationalizability concept of Pearce (1984) . To do so, we first extend the notion of sequential rationality and then redefine the best-rationalization principle as outlined by Battigalli (1997) and Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) . Sequential rationality. Our basic behavioral assumption is that player i chooses and carries out a strategy s i that reaches singleton information set h i and is optimal given his hierarchy of beliefs μ i , conditional upon any singleton information set consistent with s i . It is thus not required that a strategy specifies behavior at singleton information sets that cannot be reached by s i .
Fix a singleton information set h i . Player i's expectation of the psychological payoff u i , given s i and μ i is
Given a hierarchy of beliefs μ i 2 M i , strategy s i is a sequential best response to μ i if for all h i 2 I i :
For any hierarchy of beliefs μ i , let BR i ðμ i Þ denote the set of strategies s i that are sequential best responses to μ i . The set of best responses thus consists of strategies s i of player i that, for a given μ i , are undominated at every singleton information set h i 2 H i , given his awareness at h i . Clearly, BR i is nonempty valued. The first-order belief α i ðÁjh i Þ is continuous. Since u i is also continuous, we have that α i ðÁjh i Þ × u i ðÁ, ÁÞ is continuous, which implies that BR i is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence.
To see how the extension of sequential rationality works, consider Bob in Figure 3 . Bob's strategy s B = fcdg, for example, is sequential rational if it is undominated by his other strategiesŝ B 2 fcc, dc, ddg at every h B 2 H B . Bob is unaware when he is active at singleton information set h B ðx 1 Þ. Best-rationalization principle. Our redefinition of the best-rationalization principle requires that players' beliefs conditional upon observing singleton information set h i be consistent with the highest degree of strategic sophistication of the other player. In the following we clarify what we mean by strategic sophistication in terms of dynamic psychological games with unawareness. Consider the following extensive-form rationalization procedure for player i:
for which s i 2 BRðμ i Þ , . . .
, R i ½k = s i 2 S i such that there exists a hierarchy of beliefs μ i 2 M i ½k for which s i 2 BRðμ i Þ .
Let R i ½∞ = T k ≥ 0 R i ½k. Player i's strategies in R i ½∞ are said to be extensive-form (correlated) rationalizable in a dynamic psychological game with simple unawareness.
Simple Unawareness in Dynamic Psychological Games
Intuitively our definition of extensive-form rationalizability starts at the level of strategic thinking of player i, whose step 1 rationalizable strategies are sequential best responses to some nonrestricted hierarchy of beliefs. Strategies that are not sequential best responses to any nonrestricted hierarchy of beliefs are not step 1 rationalizable.
Next, player i restricts his hierarchies of beliefs to those for which he, at each singleton information set h i , is certain (given his awareness) of those step 1 rationalizable strategies of player j that reach h i . Player i then chooses step 2 rationalizable strategies that are sequential best responses to these restricted hierarchies of beliefs. Strategies that are not sequential best responses to these restricted hierarchies of beliefs, on player j's step 1 rationalizable strategies, are not step 2 rationalizable.
Furthermore, player i must restrict his restricted hierarchies of beliefs to those for which he, at each singleton information set h i , is certain (given his awareness) of those step 2 rationalizable strategies of player j that reach h i . Player i then chooses step 3 rationalizable strategies that are sequential best responses to these twice restricted hierarchies of beliefs. Strategies that are not sequential best responses to these twice restricted hierarchies of beliefs, on player j's step 2 rationalizable strategies, are not step 3 rationalizable, and so on.
The sequence fR i ½k : k ≥ 0g is a weakly decreasing, that is, R i ½k + 1 R i ½k for all k. Since R i is finite the sequence converges in countably many steps. The limit is given by the first integer K such that R i ½K = R i ½K + 1. Consider the limit set R i ½K of player i. The sequence R j ½0, R j ½1, . . . , R j ½K − 1 represents a hierarchy of increasingly strong hypotheses of player i about the behavior of player j. When player i implements a strategy s i 2 R i ½K, he always optimize accordingly. At the beginning of the game, it is the common knowledge that all players update and behave in this way.
The set M k (for k > 1) implies that along each feasible path of play, at a singleton information set an active player is certain that the other player sequential best responds, certain that the other player is certain he sequential best responds, and so on. If a player finds himself at a succeeding singleton information set, where the other player's strategies that could lead to that singleton information set are inconsistent with the player's previous certainty in the other player's best response, then the player seeks a best rationalization that could have led to that singleton information set. That is, if the player is "surprised" by the other player's unexpected action, and cannot use Bayesian updating, then he forms new beliefs that justify this observed inconsistency. In its simplest form, forward-induction reasoning involves the assumption that, upon observing an unexpected (but undominated) action of the other player, a player maintains the working hypothesis that the latter is a sequential rational. The best-rationalization principle captures precisely this type of argument.
Forward-induction reasoning thus implies that at h B ðx 0 Þ and onwards, unaware Bob is certain that Ann's sequential best response is s T A = fCg. However, if singleton information set h B ðx 2 Þ is reached and Bob becomes aware, then he is certain given his newly found awareness that Ann's action s A = fCDg is a sequential best response to some hierarchy of beliefs of hers. At h B ðx 2 Þ, Bob has no choice but to revert to being certain that Ann would not choose the strategy s A = fCCg rationally, and excludes Ann's hierarchies of beliefs for which s A = fCCg is a sequential best response.
Two Examples
In the following we present two examples to highlight the impact and importance of simple unawareness in dynamic psychological games. In particular, our examples demonstrate that the strategic behavior of players motivated by psychological payoffs can be effected by unawareness even in situations where it would not have mattered had the player been selfish. In these situations the aware player often has a subtle incentive to manage the awareness of the unaware player by disclosing paths of play if possible. In the first example, we analyze a sequential prisoners dilemma featuring unawareness and reciprocity. Second, we re-visit our introductory Ann/Bob-example featuring guilt aversion. A full description of the strategic interaction with all possible awareness levels is beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, we limit the analysis to specific awareness scenarios. Example 1 (reciprocity). Consider the the extensive-form underlying the sequential prisonors dilemma with unawareness depicted in Figure 3 now with Ann's and Bob's material payoffs added.
Remember, at the initial node x 0 , Ann is active and can corporate (the action C)
or defect (the action D). At nodes x 1 and x 2 , Bob is active and can corporate (the action c) or defect (the action d). In the strategic setting depicted in Figure 4 , Ann is initially aware of everything, whereas Bob is initially unaware. Ann knows this, and knows that he only becomes aware of everything if she chooses D. Also, Ann knows that Bob perceives her to be unaware. The "solid arrows" indicate Ann's singleton information sets, while the "broken arrows" indicate Bob's singleton information sets. For the sake of simplicity, we omit Bob's redundant singleton information sets at y 0 and y 1 .
We assume that Bob is motivated by reciprocity and Ann is selfish. Bob's psychological payoff is thus described by eq.
[2], while Ann only cares about her material payoff π A ðzÞ. Ann's optimal strategy depends on her first-order belief about Bob strategy (conditional on her behavior). Her strategy s A = fCCg is a sequential best response as long as her expected material payoff from strategy s A = fCCg exceeds her expected material payoff from strategy s A = fCDg. Her expected material payoff from strategy s A = fCCg is:
where α A ðfcÁgjh A ðx 0 ÞÞ : = P sB2fcc, cdg α A ðs B jh A ðx 0 ÞÞ is a shorthand notation for
Ann's first-order belief about the strategies of Bob that select the action c at the singelton information set h B ðx 1 Þ. Ann's expected material payoff from following strategy s A = fCDg is:
where α A ðfÁcgjh A ðx 0 ÞÞ : = P s B 2fcc, dcg α A ðs B jh A ðx 0 ÞÞ is an akin shorthand notation.
The step 1 rationalizable strategies of Ann are thus
Bob, on the other hand, is initially passive and only becomes active at singleton information sets h B ðx 1 Þ and h B ðx 2 Þ. Remember that at singleton information set 
Although Bob is motivated by reciprocity as defined in eq.
[2], his behavior in our sequential prisoners dilemma with unawareness is independent of his (second-order) beliefs and independent of his sensitivity to reciprocity Y B .
Bob's set of step 1 rationalizable strategies is a singleton set R B ½1 = fddg. Ann is thus at all her singelton information sets certain that Bob follows strategy s B = fddg. That is, Ann's hierarchy of beliefs μ A 2 M A ½2 are all such that α A ðfddgjÁÞ = 1. Being certain that Bob chooses d no matter what, Ann's sequential best response strategy must also select D as an action (since 0 > − 1). The step 2 rationalizable strategies of Ann are thus
Ann anticipates that given his awareness, Bob judges her as unkind and chooses d independent of what she does. Consequently, since Ann is only interested in her own material payoff, she chooses D herself to get a material payoff of 0 instead of − 1.
To study the impact of unawareness, we compare this scenario to the rationalizable solution of the sequential prisoners dilemma with reciprocity and full awareness (see Figure 5) . Now Ann chooses to C in the initial singleton information set h A ðx 0 Þ as long as she believes sufficiently strongly that Bob will choose c. Her expected payoff
Simple Unawareness in Dynamic Psychological Games from choosing either s A = fCCg or s A = fCDg at h A ðx 0 Þ is the same as before, and her step 1 rationalizable strategies are again:
Bob's optimal behavior at h B ðx 2 Þ remains the same as before. 
The lower Bob's second-order belief is, the kinder he perceives Ann's strategy
, which provides him with a payoff which is higher than if she had chosen strategy s A = fCDg. At h B ðx 1 Þ, Bob never actually thinks Ann is unkind. The question at this augmented history simply is whether he thinks she is kind enough, given his sensitivity to reciprocity Y B , such that he prefers to reciprocate her kindness. If Bob's sensitivity to reciprocity is low (Y B ≤ 1 2 ), such that he for sure chooses d if Ann chooses C, then Ann will choose strategy s A = fCDg as this provides her with a higher expected material payoff. Conversely, if Bob's sensitivity to reciprocity is high (Y B ≥ 1), Ann is certain that Bob chooses c if she chooses C. Given this, she chooses strategy s A = fCCg as this provides her with a higher expected material payoff. Notice, if Bob is sensitive enough to Ann's kindness, then he chooses c at h B ðx 1 Þ independent of his second-order belief. Given this Ann also chooses C, something she would not do were she sure that Bob would be unaware. Based on R B ½1, Ann's beliefs are
At step 2 reasoning, Ann is certain that a very sensitive Bob will always choose c if she also chooses C, whereas a very insensitive 
where γ A denotes Ann's (third-order) point belief about Bob's second-order belief. Based on R A ½2, Bob's step 3 beliefs are
where δ B denotes Bob's (fourth-order) belief about Ann's third-order beliefs. M B ½3 implies that Bob believes that Ann expects him to choose s B = fcdg whenever he finds himself at singleton information set h B ðx 1 Þ. Bob's step 3 rationalizable strategies are thus: and he defects although he believes that Ann believes that he will choose c. Finally, Ann's step 4 rationalizable strategies are:
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With full awareness, if Bob is sufficiently sensitive to reciprocity (Y B ≥ 1), then Ann chooses C since this induces Bob to choose c. This stands in contrast to the result of the first awareness scenario in which Bob was unaware of Ann's possibility to defect even after her choice C. This example highlights that, although reciprocity is only based on first-and second-order beliefs, the recursive nature of extensive-form rationalizability requires the specification of higher (potentially infinite) orders of beliefs. In synthesis, although Bob's sensitivity to reciprocity might be very high, his behavior in the first scenario stands in contrast to the result in the second senario. With full awareness Bob's behavior following Ann's action C depends on Bob's sensitivity to reciprocity. For sufficiently high levels of sensitivity Bob reciprocates by choosing c. With unawareness Bob's behavior is independent of his sensitivity to reciprocity. Bob simply defects as he perceives Ann's action as unkind no matter what she does. As a consequence, also Ann's behavior is qualified -she defects as well. Interestingly, Bob behaves as if he is selfish, although he is not. It is only his subjective perception concerning the strategic environment which drives his behavior.
It is at the intersection of these two scenarios that the implications of unawareness for the behavior of people motivated by psychological payoffs become most visible. If Bob were only interested in his own material payoff, his behavior in the two scenarios would be the same. Most importantly, being only interested in his material payoff Bob would choose d following Ann's decision to choose C independent of whether there are different awareness levels (as in the first scenario) or not (as in the second scenario). It is only his psychological payoff which explains the above-described difference in behavior. Ann thus has a strong incentive to make Bob aware and choose C. As long as Bob is unaware that Ann could have defected, he will not perceive her corporation as kind. However, were Ann able to make Bob aware, then she (as well as Bob) would have been better off. This shows, similar to our example in the introduction, how the opportunity to disclose paths of play is important when players are motivated by psychological payoffs.
Example 2 (guilt aversion): Consider again the example from the introduction featuring Bob's birthday party and Ann's final exam at university. Assume Bob would like to organize a party and would be happy if Ann could come. Bob gets a material payoff of 2 from not organizing the party (denoted NP), he gets a material payoff of 3 from organizing the party (denoted P) if Ann can join in, and a material payoff of 1 if she cannot make it. Thus, he would rather not organize the party if Ann cannot make it. Furthermore, assume that Bob is unaware of the second date, and hence, he is certain that she cannot make it.
Suppose that Ann knows what Bob is aware of, thus she knows that he is certain that she has an exam the day after his birthday party and cannot come, but in addition she also knows that she could actually write the final exam 2 months later at a second date. Denote her decision to write the exam on the first date (the day after the party) by No 1 and the second date by No 2. She can only attend his party if she decides to write the exam on date No 2, if either Bob does not organize a party (NP) or Ann chooses No 1, she writes the exam on the first date. Assume Ann's material payoff from not going to the party and writing the exam on the second date is 4, whereas her material payoff from going to the party and writing the exam on the second date is 2. Figure 6 depicts this simple unawareness game. Assume Ann is motivated by simple guilt aversion as described by eq. [1] with θ > 2, and that Bob is only interested in his own material payoff. The "solid arrows" now indicate Bob's singleton information sets, while the "broken arrows" indicate Ann's singleton information sets. Again we omit redundant singleton information sets.
Before looking at this unawareness game consider -as a benchmark -a situation of full awareness. With full awareness the rationalizable solution is that Bob chooses P and Ann chooses No 2. The reason is the following: Bob only chooses P if it implies an expected material payoff which is higher than 2. That is, Since Bob can be certain that Ann will choose No 2 if he chooses P this is the only rationalizable outcome. Consider now the case with unawareness on Bob's side. Bob would only choose to organize a party if he sufficiently believed that Ann could come. Because Bob is unaware of the second exam date, he is certain that he will get a material payoff of 1 if he organizes the party and 2 if he does not. Bob's only rationalizable strategy is to not organize the party (that is, choose NP). Ann knows that unaware Bob is not "let down Ann takes the exam on the second date then she is certain that she will not feel guilt, however she will only get a psychological payoff of 2. Ann's only rationalizable strategy is to take the exam on the first date (that is, choose No 1). Like the previous example featuring reciprocity, also this example with guilt aversion demonstrates the impact of unawareness on players motivated by psychological payoffs and highlights the subtle incentive to disclose paths of play to the unaware player. In this game Ann has no incentive to make Bob aware of the second date as long as she is sure that he will never become aware of it because this leaves her with a payoff of 4 instead of 2. Interestingly, were Ann only interested in his own material payoff, she would not be concerned about Bob being or not being aware of her action No 2. Ann would in any case choose to write the exam on date No 1 irrespective of Bob's awareness.
Conclusion
We have analyzed the influence and importance of simple unawareness concerning feasible paths of play for the strategic interaction of players in dynamic psychological games, and defined a two-player model in which players are motivated by psychological payoffs and simple unawareness of certain feasible paths of play. Using this model we provide different examples highlighting the role of unawareness in the strategic interaction of players motivated by reciprocity à la Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and guilt aversion à la Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) . Our examples demonstrate that the strategic behavior of players motivated by belief-dependent preferences crucially depends on their awareness concerning the strategic environment they are in, their perception concerning the awareness of others, their perception concerning the perception of others etc. In other words, unawareness has a profound and intuitive impact on the strategic interaction of players motivated by psychological payoffs -a fact that creates both an opportunity as well as a challenge to empirically investigations analyzing the strength and nature of psychological payoffs. Concentrating on two-player environments and simple awareness scenarios obviously puts limits to the strategic situations that can be analyzed with our model. Nevertheless our simple model has allowed us to uncover intriguing effects. More general strategic environments with more complex awareness scenarios are left for future research.
